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Purpose- This study aims to determine the relationship between 
free cash flow and investment efficiency of quoted manufacturing 
companies in Nigeria. 
Design- An accounting-based model developed by Richardson 
(2006) was employed to measure investment efficiency and free 
cash flow. The population of the study consist of all the listed 
manufacturing companies in Nigeria. Similarly, the purposive 
sampling technique was employed to arrive at forty-eight 
companies for 2008-2018. 
Findings- The results of the study confirm the agency theory of 
free cash flow. Hence, it established that there is a positive and 
robust relationship between free cash flow and overinvestment. 
Practical Implications- the findings of this study has practical 
implications to various group of users of financial information such 
as investors, policymakers and other stakeholders in the listed 
manufacturing sector in Nigeria. The study recommends that 
policymakers reduce the cost of debt, and likewise, managers 
should emphasize the facilitation of equity capital. 
Originality- To the best of the researcher's knowledge, this is the 
first study to examine the relationship between free cash flow and 
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The finance literature has debated heavily on the issue of investment inefficiencies. Researchers have advanced 
many reasons as to the cause of inefficient investment, which manifests itself in the form of over-or-
underinvestment that can damage the interest of shareholders. Firms invest efficiently in a perfect market when 
they undertake all the investments that will result in positive net present value projects and discard those 
investments that will lead to harmful net present value projects. Though previous studies (e.g., Angela & Rilya, 
2017; Chen, Hope, Li, & Wang, 2011; Cherkasova & Rasadi, 2017; Fakhroni et al., 2018; Guariglia & Yang, 
2016; Nekhili, Fakhfakh, Amar, Chtioui, & Lakhal, 2016) suggest otherwise, this is as a result of the presence 
of market frictions. Thus, market frictions resulting in a clash of interest between shareholders, managers, and 
other stakeholders leads to agency conflict and asymmetric information. This clash of interest ultimately leads 
to passing up investment opportunities with a positive net present value outcome (underinvestment) and 
accepting projects that yield negative net present value outcomes (overinvestment), thus harming the interest 
of shareholders. Therefore, agency theory states that excess cash at the management's disposal after exhausting 
all expected investments provides a significant chance for the manager's abnormal behavior (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).   
However, despite the significance of investment, most of the extant studies were carried out in advanced 
economies with little empirical evidence in emerging economies, even though emerging economies make up a 
more significant proportion of the economic activities in the world (Rad et al. 2016).  More so is the fact that 
the problems of agency conflicts are more pronounced in emerging markets because of its capital market 
imperfections and its weak corporate governance structures. Thus, the relationship between free cash flow 
(henceforth FCF) and investment efficiency (IE) remains unclear in an African context. Hence, findings from 
advanced countries may not sustain the prediction of agency theory from an African economy such as Nigeria. 
For this reason, this study investigates the extent to which FCF impacts IE in the listed manufacturing sector 
in Nigeria from 2008-2018. Consequently, this study extends the field of application of FCF on IE in the listed 
manufacturing companies in Nigeria.  
The motivation for this study is threefold; first, prior literature focused majorly on developed economies with 
little emphasis on emerging economies. Second, despite the minor focus on emerging economies, most studies 
focused on Asian and South American economies with significant African economies. Third, Nigeria is the hub 
of the African economy, with the largest economy in Africa (Umoru and Nwokoye 2018). As such, it will be 
the ideal country to examine in the African context. The manufacturing sector is one of the most critical sectors 
that bring about rapid industrialization and economic growth in any country in the world over (Ogunleye et al. 
2018).  Generally, the development of the industrial sector has been an essential component in the fruitful 
change of many powerful nations' states that have witnessed continued increases in revenues (Soderbom and 
Teal 2002). The sector is presumed to be a significant and robust determinant of growth, can reduce the poverty 
rate, and brings about sustainable development in an economy. The manufacturing industry is perceived as a 
standard for assessing a nation-states' economic progress and advancement. In light of this, the significance of 
the manufacturing sector's contributions to the growth of an economy cannot be over-stressed. However, 
despite this significance, the Nigerian manufacturing sector has fared poorly due to the over-reliance on crude 
oil, inadequate infrastructures, shortage of skilled labor, and inadequate financial resources (Ku, Mustapha, and 
Goh 2010). 
The manufacturing sector can complement Nigerian government efforts at boosting local investment and 
making significant contributions to the nation's economic growth and development. Hence, efficient 
investment would have been the key; since investment is seen to prevent backwardness and recession (Jafari 
2016). Consequently, Nigeria needs to emphasize firm-level investment, thereby ensuring an efficient 
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investment of its resources. Similarly, the growth of the capital market in Nigeria creates new opportunities for 
stakeholders and, at the same time, exposes managers to a large pool of FCF, shareholders, and creditors. Such 
exposure calls for stricter regulations and places more restrictions on the management's decision-making 
processes.  
The remainder of the paper is organized thus: Section two reviews related literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Section three presents the sample and the methodology. Section four displays the main empirical 
results, and Section five concludes. 
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
The concept of IE is well established in the literature of finance (Biddle et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011; 
Cherkasova & Rasadi, 2017; Gao & Yu, 2018; Guariglia & Yang, 2016; Majeed et al., 2017; Mcdermott, 2012; 
McNichols & Stubben, 2008; Moez & Amina, 2018; Nekhili, Fakhfakh, Tawhid, et al., 2016; Richardson, 2006; 
Verdi, 2006). Researchers all over the globe have given a divergent opinion on IE. For example, Majeed, Zhang, 
& Muhammad (2017) view IE as the required size of investment expenditure, calculated as the level of projected 
investment based on an increased sales level. Positive deviation from the predicted level is considered 
overinvestment, that is, investment higher than expected level. Also, negative deviance from the predicted level 
is regarded as underinvestment; investment is lower than expected. This research follows the definition of  
Biddle & Hilary (2006); Mcdermott (2012)  that conceptually define investment efficiency as those firms that 
undertake projects that have positive net present value (NPV). Moreover, underinvestment or low investment 
refers to not taking investment opportunities that would yield a positive NPV. At the same time, overinvestment 
or excess investment refers to engaging in investment with a negative NPV. Consequently, both 
underinvestment and overinvestment are regarded as inefficient investments.  
There is no association between a company's investments and its FCF (Modigliani and Miller 1958). 
Nonetheless, several studies have shown a positive relationship between investment inefficiency and FCF. 
Richardson (2006) study in the USA reveals that firms overinvest 20% of their excess FCF. Two possible 
scenarios may be the reasons for this association; the first is asymmetric information, and the second is agency 
costs. Asymmetric information among lenders, investors, and managers may affect investment decisions, 
resulting in inefficient investment. For instance, because of asymmetric information, managers tend to have 
superior information than outside capital providers regarding the actual development of the firm, possibly 
leading to a situation by which outside capital providers cannot make optimal investment decisions (Lai, Liu, 
and Wang 2013). Because of the information at the managers' discretion, they may be inclined to issue capital 
when the company is high-priced or issue costly capital to stakeholders since they have more information about 
the companies actual worth (Firth, Xie, and Zhang 2016). 
Consequently, if managers can raise funds through this means, they will have excess funds, resulting in 
overinvesting such funds. This situation will enable managers to invest in unnecessary projects, thus 
overinvesting such funds rather than returning them to the owners (Chen, 2017). Conversely, because of 
inadequate information at their disposal, lenders may sense such opportunistic behaviors by managers and react 
by raising the firm's cost of debt (Lai et al., 2013). This situation can affect every company, including the ones 
that do not overvalue their shares prices. Therefore, because they will opt to protect existing shareholders, they 
will be forced to forfeit outstanding investment ventures rather than sell their shares below their actual worth. 
In turn, they may have to resort to internal funds for their investment projects (Cherkasova and Zakharova 
2016). This situation could lead to financial constraints. Firms that are financially constrained tend to 
underinvest when the cost of raising external funds is high. This constrain is due to the capital market 
imperfections, leading to the high cost of debt. The cost of raising outside finance forces companies to source 
funds internally. In these situations, firms with inadequate funds may have to waive profitable investment 
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opportunities because of the high debt associated with external funding (Guariglia and Yang 2016). Therefore, 
firms with a lack of adequate finance are more prone to underinvest (Li, Monroe, and Coulton 2018). Thus, the 
high sensitivity of underinvestment to FCF might be perceived as evidence of negative cash flow. Hence, 
resulting in underinvestment because of the high cost of external financing and the over-reliance of firms on 
internal funds. 
The second reason is the agency cost. The separation of ownership and control brings about agency costs, 
thereby facilitating overinvestment. Managers in firms with excess FCF have an excellent reason to overinvest 
such funds (Jensen, 1986). Because of the separation of ownership and control that leads to agency cost, 
management may invest in projects for selfish reasons, which are helpful from the management viewpoint but 
may not be suitable for the owners of the company (Chen et al., 2016). The agency cost explanation is more so 
for companies with excess FCF. The agency cost problem of FCF is a problem between management and 
shareholders of the firm related to the company's usage of its excess FCF (Fakhroni et al. 2018). The clash of 
interests between the management and the outsider could lead managers to expropriation by utilizing the firm's 
FCF (Jensen, 1986). The insiders can exert control of the firms' resources than outsiders and have more 
information. Managers' quest to expand their power through control over more significant resources has 
increased their desire to enlarge the firm beyond its capacity (Jensen, 1986). It is hence overinvesting the firms' 
resources. 
Therefore, the availability of excess FCF will provide a more significant opportunity for managers' dysfunctional 
behavior. The discussion so far has given rise to the agency problem of FCF. FCF refers to excess cash to be 
distributed to shareholders as dividends. Economic experts contend that a percentage of cash flows from 
operating activities should be given as dividends to shareholders and not only be financed in new investment 
projects only as the case may be (Bhundia 2012). However, conflicts of interest among stakeholders in the firm 
may cause the FCF not to be given to the shareholders, subsequently leading to an agency problem of FCF. 
Jensen (1986) contends that giving dividends creates one of the main problems among stakeholders because it 
decreases the number of funds under the control of the management, thereby lessening their influence. The 
decrease of funds in the manager's custody makes it more likely to monitor the capital market because of the 
firm's need to get new funds. Funding investment projects internally avoid this monitoring cost. Another issue 
advanced by Jensen (1986) is that insiders have the motivation to cause the company to grow more than its 
average scope. Such growth increases the manager's powers since it increases the resources under their 
management, increasing their remuneration. 
From the discussion above, it can be inferred that investment inefficiency centers on the availability of free cash 
and its utilization. Hence, firms with excess cash may engage in overinvestment, and likewise, firms with 
inadequate free cash may engage in underinvestment. 
Based on the preceding, the following hypotheses are formulated as follows: 
H1:  Free cash flows are negatively associated with investment efficiency in the listed manufacturing companies 
in Nigeria. 
H2:  Free cash flows have no significant influence on overinvestment in the listed manufacturing companies in 
Nigeria. 
H3:  Free cash flows do not influence underinvestment in the listed manufacturing companies in Nigeria. 
Methodology 
The research design for this study is explanatory. At the same time, the population consists of all the sixty 
manufacturing companies quoted on the first-tier securities market of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) as 
of 31st December 2018. A purposive sampling technique was used for this research. An accounting-based 
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model developed by Richardson (2006) was employed to measure IE. The model has been used severally by 
prior research in this area (Chen et al., 2011; Cherkasova & Rasadi, 2017; Moez & Amina, 2018). The model 
predicts the firm's IE, and the model's residuals were used as a proxy for inefficient investment. The residual 
from the model was used to measure investment inefficiency as deviations from normal investment, which is a 
function of growth opportunities. The positive deviations from the expected investment are termed 
overinvestment, while negative deviations from the normal investment are termed underinvestment. 
Consequently, both overinvestment and underinvestment are termed inefficient investments. The model is 
described below: 
Investmentit = β0 + β1Growthi,t-1  + β2Leverage i,t-1 + β3Cash i,t-1 + β4Size i,t-1 + β5Return i,t-1 + β6Agei,t-1 +  
β7Investment i,t-1 + Ɛit………………………………………………………..…………………………………………………..(i) 
Where; Investmentit is the totality of research and development expenditures, capital expenses and acquisitions 
minus sales of property, plant, and equipment (PPE), scaled by lagged total asset for the company i at the end 
of year t-1. 
Growthi,t-1; is the yearly income growth percentage for the company i at the end of year t-1β2 
Leverage i,t-1; is the financial leverage of the firm, is calculated as the ratio of non-current debt to the sum of 
non-current debt plus the current stock price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding of firm i at the 
end of year t-1, β3 
Cash i,t-1; is the proportion of cash to the total asset of firm i at the end of year t-1 
β4Size i,t-1; is the logarithm of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1 
β5Return i,t-1; is the change in market value over that of the prior year 
β6Agei,t-1; is the difference between the number of years the firm has been in existence and at the end of year t-
1 
β7Investment i,t-1;  is the lag of investment or previous investment 
The independent variable used in this study is FCF. An accounting-based model developed by Richardson 
(2006) was utilized in measuring FCF. Several researchers have applied the model in their research (Chen et al., 
2016; Fusheng et al., 2015; Moez & Amina, 2018). FCF is cash flow more than required to maintain assets in 
place, including maintaining existing debt and funding normal optimal new investments (Richardson 2006). 
Estimates of three constituents were utilized in measuring FCF; 
An estimate of cash flow from assets in place (CFAIP). 
An estimate of investment expenditure essential to sustain assets in place (IMAINTENANCE).  
An estimate of the normal level of new investment expenditure (INEW). 
Thus, to ascertain cash flow from assets in place, CFAIP; 
CFAIP = CFO – IMAINTENANCE + RD 
Finally, to calculate FCF, the following is applied: 
FCF = CFAIP – I*NEW………………………………………………………………………………………………….(ii) 
Note: expected new investment (I* NEW) is the absolute residual of the investment model defined above. 
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Consistent with Moez & Amina (2018), the FCFs obtained above were scaled by the total assets' book value to 
control the size effect. 
Motivated by prior studies, several control variables were included in this study used in prior research as 
determinants of investment decisions (e.g., Chen et al., 2011; Cherkasova & Rasadi, 2017; Fusheng et al., 2015; 
Richardson, 2006). These control variables include; size, firm age, the level of cash, leverage, growth, cash flow 
from operations, tangibility, slack, past stock, lagged investment, and returns. These variables are explained in 
the table below.  
Table 1: Control Variable Definition and Its Measurement 
Variable Definition Measurement 
Growthi,t-1 Growth opportunity proportional change in income from year t – 2 to t – 1 (see, 
Cherkasova & Rasadi, 2017; Moez & Amina, 2018)  
Leverage i,t-1 Financial leverage The proportion of the amount of the book value total debt 
to total assets for firm i at the end of year t-1(see Biddle et 
al., 2009; Moez & Amina, 2018) 
Cash i,t-1 Level of liquidity The proportion of cash to the total asset of firm i at the end 
of year t-1 (see, Cherkasova & Rasadi, 2017) 
Size i,t-1 Firm size Log of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1(see,  Moez 
& Amina, 2018) 
Return i,t-1 Stock returns Stock returns of firm i at the end of year t-1 (see Wang et al. 
2015) 
Agei,t-1 Age of the firm is the number 
of years the firm has been in 
existence  
This is the difference between the first year of incorporation 
of firm i and year 2018 for firm I at the end of year t-1 (see 
Wang et al. 2015) 
Tangibility Tangible assets This is the proportion of property plant and equipment to 
total assets (Biddle et al. 2009) 
Lagged 
investment 
prior firm-level investment (Cherkasova and Rasadi 2017; Moez and Amina 2018; 
Richardson 2006) 
CFO cash flow from operations This is the ratio of cash flow from operations to sales 
(Biddle and Hilary 2006; Verdi 2006) 
Slack Slack This is the proportion of cash to property plant and 
equipment (Chen et al. 2011; Verdi 2006) 
Source: Extracted and summarized by the researcher from previous studies  
The following regression model was utilised in assessing the effect of FCF on IE.  
I*newi,t = βo + β2FCF I,t-1 + β4Grwti,t-1  + β5Lev I,t-1 + β6Cash I,t-1 + β7Size I,t-1 + β8Ret I,t-1 + β9Age I,t-1 + β10Tani,t-1 + 
β11Inv i,t-1 + β12CFOit +  β13Slack I,t-1 + Ɛit……………………………………….……………..(iii) 
Where: 
I*new = Investment Efficiency 
FCF = Free cash flow 
Grwt = Growth 
Lev = Leverage 
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Ret = Stock returns 
Tan = Tangibility 
Inv = Lagged investment 
CFO = cash flow from operations 
IEnewi,t = βo + β2FCF I,t-1 + β4Grwti,t-1  + β5Lev I,t-1 + β6Cash I,t-1  + β8Ret I,t-1 + β9Age I,t-1 + β10Tani,t-1 + β12CFOit +  
β13Slack I,t-1 + Ɛit……………………………………………………….……………………….(iv) 
Where: 
IEnew = Overinvestment, the rest of the variable is as defined in equation (iii) 
IEnewi,t = βo + β2FRQ I,t-1 + β4Grwti,t-1  + β5Lev I,t-1 + β6Cash I,t-1 + β7Size I,t-1 + β8Ret I,t-1 + β10Tani,t-1 + β11Inv i,t-1 + 
β12CFOit +  β13Slack I,t-1 + Ɛit…………… ………………………………(v)  
Where:  
IEnew = Underinvestment, the rest of definition of the variable name is same as equation (iii) 
Results and Discussion 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
Variables OBS Mean STD Min Max 
InvEff 528 0.0535 0.0206 0.0065 0.0959 
OverInv 222 0.0694 0.0770 0.0000 0.3876 
UnderInv 306 0.0504 0.2218 -0.1262 3.8112 
FCF 528 -0.0163 0.1610 -1.4826 1.4247 
Grwt 528 0.0695 0.2256 -0.3901 0.5330 
Lev 528 0.5403 0.3710 0.0000 3.7225 
Cash 528 0.1004 0.1810 0.0000 1.3431 
Size 528 9.0504 2.9632 0.0000 12.207 
Return 528 0.0174 0.3614 -0.8894 0.7565 
Age 528 39.659 22.696 0.0000 94.000 
Lag Inv 528 0.0477 0.0315 -0.3490 0.1662 
Tan 528 0.3936 0.2559 0.0000 1.1899 
CFOS 528 0.1153 0.1859 -0.3261 0.5435 
Slack 528 0.2322 0.2857 0.0000 1.6898 
Source: Computed by the Researcher using STATA16  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for investment efficiency consisting of 528 firm-year observations 
from 2008-2018. The mean value of investment efficiency for Nigeria's sampled listed manufacturing 
companies reveals an average value of about 0.054. This means that listed manufacturing companies in Nigeria 
invest efficiently, on average, about 5.4% of their assets. The average value of 0.054 is lower than the result of 
(Cherkasova and Rasadi 2017), which is 0.07 and also lower than the average value of (Moez and Amina 2018) 
of 0.09 as well as 13.1% of (Richardson 2006). This clearly shows that the advanced countries have a higher 
level of investment efficiency than emerging economies, as evidenced by the result of (Moez and Amina 2018; 
Richardson 2006).   
The descriptive statistics for overinvesting firms in the listed manufacturing sector consist of 222 firm-year 
observations. The mean value of overinvestment for Nigeria's sampled listed manufacturing companies reveals 
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an average value of about 0.069. This shows that listed manufacturing companies in Nigeria overinvest, on 
average, about 6.9% of their assets. The average value of 0.069 is lower than the result reported by (Wang et al. 
2015), which is 0.085 and the result reported by (Cherkasova and Rasadi 2017) of 0.071, but higher than the 
average value of (Moez and Amina 2018) of 0%. This shows that there is a variation in the level of 
overinvestment in emerging economies. Nonetheless, the results reveal that overinvestment in emerging 
economies such as China and Eastern Europe is higher than that of Nigeria. However, advanced countries such 
as the US have lower overinvestment problems (with up to 0% overinvestment), as documented in previous 
studies such as Moez and Amina (2018); Richardson (2006).  
The descriptive statistics for underinvesting firms in the listed manufacturing sector comprise 306 firm-year 
observations from 2008-2018. The mean value of underinvestment for the sampled firms shows an average 
value of about 0.05. This means listed manufacturing firms in Nigeria underinvest, on average, about 5% of 
their assets. The average value of 0.05 is lower than the result reported by (Wang et al. 2015) of 0.07 but higher 
than the average value of (Chen et al. 2011) of 4.3% and the result reported by (Cherkasova and Rasadi 2017) 
of 1.6%. The variation in the level of underinvestment shows that overall, underinvestment is more prevalent 
in emerging economies. 
Table 3: Regression Result of the Impact of FCF on Investment Efficiency 




































































R-Sq. 0.688 0.073 0.038 
Source: Computed by the Researcher using STATA16 
***, **, * denote that the parameter estimates are statistical significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Model one in Table 3 presents the relationship results between the dependent variable (IE) and the explanatory 
variables, answering research hypothesis one. Looking at the individual variable contribution to the model, 
starting with the independent variable FCF, the OLS result reveals that FCF has a positive and strong 
relationship at a 5% level of significance with IE of listed manufacturing firms in Nigeria. This implies that an 
increase in FCF leads to a proportionate increase in IE after controlling for all the other variables in the model. 
These findings support Ebrahimi Rad et al., (2016); Sheu & Lee, (2012), who found that investment has a 
significantly positive relationship with FCF in China and Malaysia, respectively. This means that financially 
constraint firms may experience investment inefficiencies due to lack of cash since positive free cash is a 
significant determinant of investment efficiency in listed manufacturing firms in Nigeria. 
For the control variables, the OLS regression outcomes reveal that cash, past stock returns, age and cash flow 
from operations are positively and statistically significant at a 1% level of significance with IE. This indicates 
that an increase in one of these control variables will have a proportionate increase in the level of investment 
efficiency. Similarly, tangibility and lagged investment have a positive and statistically significant relationship 
with IE at a 5% significance level. This also indicates that these control variables are essential determinants of 
efficient investment; thus, an increase in one results in a corresponding increase in investment efficiency in 
Nigeria's listed manufacturing sector. Contrastingly, leverage and size have a negative and statistically significant 
relation with IE at a 1% significance level. This means that as leverage and size increase, investment efficiency 
reduces, thus having an inverse relationship. Many factors can lead to this inverse relationship, subsequently 
leading to inefficiencies in investment. Finally, growth has a negative but statistically insignificant relationship 
with IE, whereas slack has a positive but statistically insignificant relationship with IE.  Since FCF is strongly 
significant in influencing IE, this provides the basis for rejecting the null hypothesis one of the studies. 
Model 2 in Table 3 presents the results of the association between the dependent variable overinvestment and 
the independent variable FCF, as well as the control variables (growth, leverage, cash, return, age, tangibility, 
cash flow from operations and slack), thus providing the answer to research hypothesis two. From the Table, 
it is observed that the result reveal that FCF has a positive and statistically significant impact on overinvestment 
at a 1% level of significance of quoted manufacturing companies in Nigeria. This means that an increase in FCF 
level translates into a corresponding increase in the level of overinvestment. These findings confirm the agency 
theory as it relates to the use of FCF. The findings also support the overwhelming majority of previous studies 
such as Richardson (2006), Verdi (2006), Biddle et al. (2009), Ding et al. (2012), Wang et al. (2015), Guariglia & 
Yang (2016), Chen et al. (2016), Filsaraei et al. (2016), Moez & Amina (2018). 
Similarly, slack has a positive and significant impact on overinvestment at a 1% level of significance. Hence, an 
increase in the ratio of cash to PPE leads to a resultant increase in overinvestment. Also, leverage and cash flow 
from operations have a positive but insignificant impact on overinvestment. 
Conversely, growth and age have a negative and significant impact on overinvestment at 10% and 5% levels of 
significance, respectively. Thus, growth and age have an inverse relationship with overinvestment as per listed 
manufacturing firms in Nigeria. Likewise, cash, return and tangibility has a negative but insignificant impact on 
overinvestment, hence not able to cause much influence on overinvestment in the listed manufacturing firms 
in Nigeria. Since FCF is significant in influencing overinvestment, this then provides the basis for rejecting null 
hypothesis three of the study. 
Model 3 in Table 3 presents the impact of the independent variable (FCF) and the control variables (growth, 
leverage, cash, size, return, tangibility, lagged investment, cash flow from operations and slack) on the 
dependent variable underinvestment. From the Table, it is observed that the regression model result reveal that 
FCF has a positive but statistically insignificant impact on overinvestment in the quoted manufacturing 
companies in Nigeria. This means that FCF does not increase nor reduce underinvestment in the sampled firms. 
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The findings contradict the findings of Guariglia & Yang (2016). Similarly, lagged investment has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on underinvestment at a 1% significance level. This means that lagged investment 
increases the sensitivity of underinvestment, thereby worsening the level of underinvestment among firms 
prone to underinvestment in the listed manufacturing firms in Nigeria. 
On the contrary, size has a negatively and statistically significant impact on underinvestment. This shows that 
the larger the company's size, the lower its tendency to underinvest in the listed manufacturing sector in Nigeria. 
Similarly, growth, cash and return have a negative but statistically insignificant impact on underinvestment. On 
the opposite, leverage, tangibility, cash flow from operations and slack has a positive but statistically insignificant 
impact on underinvestment. Since FCF is not significant in influencing underinvestment, this then provides the 
basis for accepting null hypothesis three of the study. 
Conclusion 
This study shows the nature of the resources (FCF) available in the manufacturing sector and its constraints on 
investment efficiency in Nigeria. Two main conclusions emerge from this study: On the one hand, having a 
consistent positive free cash flow is a requirement for achieving optimal investment level in the listed 
manufacturing companies in Nigeria. On the other hand, managers with excess free cash might engage in 
wasteful expenditure since FCF is found to have a positive and significant impact on overinvestment, which 
confirms the agency theory of FCF. The identification of FCF as a significant determinant of investment 
efficiency implies that in order to attain an optimal level of investment, firms in the listed manufacturing sector 
in Nigeria should strive to maintain a positive FCF since FCF has a substantial impact on the level of expected 
investment. Consequently, listed manufacturing firms that are highly levered and cash-constrained may find it 
challenging to attain an optimal investment level. As such, managers should emphasize the facilitation of equity 
capital on the one hand, and on the other hand, policymakers should encourage manufacturing firms by 
reducing the cost of debt.  
Similarly, information asymmetry and agency problems have been identified as explanations for overinvestment. 
Hence, to enhance investment efficiency in Nigeria, more attention should be given to the trend of accrual-
based earnings that are not sustainable, especially those related to receivables', sales, and revenue of the sector. 
Also, investors should pay close attention to the accounts of listed manufacturing firms related to the 
maintenance of assets in place, such as depreciation, which can influence earnings to look better in the current 
period but detrimental to the firm in the long run. 
However, this study is not without limitations. This work only examines the impact of FCF and on IE. Future 
studies can look at other aspects that influence investment, such as the impact of investment on financial 
reporting quality or the effect of debt holders on IE. Another limitation is that the findings of this study cannot 
be generalized to other countries, especially advanced countries, because of the peculiarities of emerging 
markets which are reasonably different from that of an advanced country.  
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